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Abstract
Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information about the ability of financial
analysts? We show that as financial analysts become reputable, the market can get
trapped: Investors optimally choose to ignore their private information, and blindly
follow analyst recommendations. As time goes by and recommendations accumulate,
arbitrage based on the inferred ability of analysts may become profitable again. The
market can thus be trapped at times and yet be able, in the long run, to sort the pundits
from the quacks. However, this process is impaired when asset fundamentals are volatile:
in this case, the market might be trapped indefinitely.
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1 Introduction
The intensified division of labour taking place within the finance industry raises new and
important challenges. Sell-side and independent financial analysts now account for a major
part of the information used by investors to determine what stocks to trade.1 According to
Ramnath et al. (2008): “Analysts are viewed as sophisticated processors of financial informa-
tion who are less likely than naive investors to misunderstand the implications of financial
information”. Yet while independent analysts have the potential to improve markets’ effi-
ciency, their existence paves the way for a textbook moral hazard: analysts take risks in
making recommendations, but do not fully internalize the costs of those risks.2 This could be
unproblematic, if quack analysts were quickly driven out of the market. But empirical as well
as anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise.3 This paper formally investigates financial markets’
performance at sorting the pundits from the quacks.
It is a well-known fact that markets can learn about analysts’ ability based on public
information regarding underlying assets.4 This wisdom is important, but incomplete. Public
information varies across time and asset classes. Growth stocks, for instance, may take years
before generating revenue. Financial markets must rely then on the private information of
investors, in order to learn about analysts’ ability.5 The question is then: Do asset prices
aggregate investors’ private information about financial analysts? Our paper shows, alas,
that this information is (if at all) only properly aggregated in the long run: i.e., when that
information matters least.
1According to R.J. Wayman, Vice President and Portfolio Manager for Sweetwater Asset Management:
“Independent research firms are becoming the main source of information on the majority of stocks”. http:
//www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/03/031803.asp.
2In short, analysts lack ‘skin in the game’. Potential conflicts of interests is, in practice, another important
problem. We abstract here from that issue. The interested reader is referred to Ramnath et al. (2008) for an
extensive survey of that literature.
3The presence of persistent differences in the quality of analyst recommendations has been found in, for
instance, Li (2005). Furthermore, pundits in television shows that make stock recommendations are often
noted to be poor predictors of stock returns, although they have a significant short-term effect on trading.
See for instance http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wall_Street_Week#The_Rukeyser_Effect.
4See, e.g., Trueman (1994). To the extent that public information is available regarding underlying assets,
comparing the predictions of analysts with the realized values of forecasted variables provides an immediate
way of evaluating analyst ability.
5Investors’ private information about analysts is exogenous in the model we consider. Throughout, we
remain agnostic about the precise source of this information. Personal contacts is one possibility. The quality
of the analyst’s reports is another plausible source of information (Hirst et al. (1995) and Asquith et al. (2005)
find evidence in this sense). For instance, an investor may discover that an analyst has copied-pasted the
arguments he uses, or find flaws in the analyst’s underlying reasoning; alternatively, the investor may deem
the arguments laid forward by the analyst perceptive and original.
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The basic model we analyze has the following features. A finite number of assets of un-
known fixed values are traded in a market with a single long-run player (the analyst) and
an infinite sequence of short-run players (the investors). The analyst is of one of two types:
informed or uninformed.6 An informed analyst’s recommendations are correlated with the
assets’ true values. An uninformed analyst, however, knows nothing more about the assets
than the public information and makes strategic recommendations aiming to maximize his
reputation.7 A new investor arrives each period, possessing two pieces of private informa-
tion: the latest recommendation from the analyst and an imperfectly informative signal of
the analyst’s true ability. The investor then decides whether or not to follow the analyst’s
recommendation, given competitive bid and ask prices. A liquidity trader makes his decision
based on factors exogenous to the model; a speculator, on the other hand, trades to maximize
profits. The recommendation and the trade become known publicly when the period ends, at
which point the market updates its belief that the analyst is informed (i.e., the reputation of
the analyst). If all information could be centralized then the market would learn the true type
of the analyst. We explore whether, and how, the private information of investors concerning
the analyst is aggregated in the decentralized market setting described above.
Unlike all previous studies, feedback about the analyst’s ability is endogenous.8 Two
channels in our model transmit information to the market about the analyst’s true type: (i)
investors’ decision to follow or not the analyst’s advice and, (ii) recommendations themselves.
How much information each channel conveys is determined endogenously, and varies with time.
We say that a reputational trap occurs when both channels are mute and no information about
the analyst’s true type is transmitted to the market in that period.
Our analysis of the basic model revolves around two principal results:
1. We show that in the short run, and in the medium run, the market can get trapped.
Speculators follow blindly the recommendations made, and prices fail to aggregate in-
6We do not model the source of a good analyst’s superior information directly. A good analyst may
distinguish himself purely by his ability to analyze data, but could also retrieve information from his network
of connections within monitored firms.
7The basic model assumes that the analyst maximizes his expected reputation one period ahead. We
show in a later section that all our results extend to much broader settings, where the analyst maximizes
the expected discounted sum of future income, and income in a given period is an increasing function of the
analyst’s reputation.
8See the literature review for previous studies of financial analysts. In our model, feedback about the
analyst’s ability occurs endogenously through prices and recommendations made (the public information).
In particular, assets’ true values are never observed. All the paper’s main results remain valid if public
information about assets’ true values is available. This extension is considered in an online-appendix.
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vestors’ information about the analyst. The uninformed analyst maintains a lasting
reputation, and affects prices durably.
2. As time goes by and recommendations accumulate, arbitrage based on the (inferred)
ability of the analyst becomes profitable again. Thus, whereas the market gets trapped
early on, it is able to sort in the long run the pundits from the quacks.
The basic intuition behind the first point is the following. By raising the expected quality
of advice, better reputation increases the average foregone profits from ignoring a recom-
mendation. Hence when reputation is high, so too are foregone profits. Above a threshold
reputation speculators must then choose, in equilibrium, to follow all advice stemming from
the analyst.
The occurrence of reputational traps hinges upon three simple conditions: (a) non-zero
measure of liquidity traders, (b) imperfectly informed investors, and (c) good analyst repu-
tation. Without condition (a), prices would be ‘too’ elastic for a trap to occur: a speculator
would then be unable to turn a profit from his information. When the condition holds however,
a speculator benefits from prices’ relative inelasticity, and the expected profit from following
the analyst’s advice is increasing in the reputation of the analyst. Next, condition (b) ensures
the willingness of speculators to attribute negative ability signals to sheer luck, and more so
the better the reputation of the analyst. In view of the previous remarks, condition (c) is
the final ingredient leading to a reputational trap: good reputation induces speculators to
disregard their information concerning the analyst, and blindly follow the recommendations
made.
The occurrence of reputational traps naturally places a question mark over the possibility
to learn the analyst’s true type based solely on the private information of investors. In our
model, however, equilibrium conditions are determined by two layers of uncertainty: uncer-
tainty about the ability of the analyst, and uncertainty about the assets’ true values. When
the market is trapped, it stops learning about the analyst but continues, through new recom-
mendations, to learn about the assets. This, in turn, transforms the incentives of speculators
and allows us to show that reputational traps are transient events.
The intuition is the following. The recommendations of the informed analyst are correlated
with the assets’ true values. So if the analyst is informed, prices will eventually converge. This
implies in turn that the uninformed analyst must either make prices converge too, or lose his
reputation.9 However, as prices converge, speculators tend to gain less from trading based on
9This mechanism is reminiscent of, e.g., Prendergast and Stole (1996). Effectively, the analyst here makes
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the analyst’s recommendations, all the while standing to gain more from arbitrage based on
their private signal of the analyst: the more information contained in the public history, the
more critical the knowledge of the true type of the analyst. An overwhelming dominance of
‘buy’ recommendations, say, will push prices up toward their highest values. On the other
hand, a speculator with a negative ability signal will see his valuations of the assets revert
toward the unconditional mean. The higher the prices, the more the trader believes the assets
to be overvalued. As prices get close to their upper bound, this will induce him to trade
against historical trends (i.e. sell the assets), independently of the recommendation made. By
acting as contrarians in the long run, speculators thus eventually release information about the
true type of the analyst. We go on to show that – in the basic model – the market eventually
learns the true type of the analyst.10
As illustrated in the narrative above, learning about analysts is inseparable from the con-
vergence of prices in the framework we explore. This key and novel feature of our model has
important implications. We show for instance in an extension of the basic model that, if asset
fundamentals are sufficiently volatile, then learning about analysts will collapse in the short
and in the long run. The intuition is simple. In the basic model, a trap ends as historical
information embedded in prices eventually takes precedence over the current recommendation
of the analyst. This in turn forces investors to start turning to their private information with
a view to evaluate the credence of this historical information. By contrast, if fundamentals are
sufficiently volatile, then current recommendations can remain important relative to historical
information. The market may in this case remain trapped infinitely long.11
To derive empirical predictions, we then endogenize the decision of the analyst to make
a recommendation at all, in any given period. First, we show that in this case the rate of
recommendations evolves with time. The intuition is as follows. In general, the uninformed
analyst will prefer to avoid making recommendations, so as to minimize the information
released concerning his true ability. In a reputational trap however, the analyst knows that
the market will follow his recommendations with probability one. He then needs not fear
making recommendations. The rate of recommendations thus rises in a reputational trap, and
falls outside it. Since reputational traps occur when reputation is good and prices moderate,
‘persistent’ recommendations in an attempt to convince the market that he is informed.
10The analysis of the long run is complicated in our model by the fact that there is no uniform positive
lower bound on the information conveyed about the analyst in any given round: it may be nothing (as in the
case of a reputational trap), or close to nothing.
11Our long-run learning results thus contrast sharply with those of, e.g., Benabou and Laroque (1992) and
Trueman (1994) where learning is entirely unrelated to assets’ underlying volatility.
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the recommendation rate will increase under these conditions, rather than being monotonic
in either of the variables.12
Second, our model predicts large and sudden asset price movements. The reason is sim-
ple. When the market is trapped, it stops aggregating the information concerning the ability
of the analyst, but goes on accumulating information about the assets in the form of new
recommendations (at an increased rate moreover, given previous remarks). Large price move-
ments occur when the market starts learning the analyst’s true ability again, and suddenly
appreciates/depreciates all the information accumulated during the reputational trap.
Finally, the price impact from a recommendation is gradual in our model. A recommenda-
tion is first incorporated ‘at a discount’, and later adapted according to the evolution of the
analyst’s reputation. Past recommendations thus have a contemporaneous effect on prices, so
long as the market goes on learning the true ability of the analyst.13
Related literature. This paper examines a previously unexplored aspect of financial
markets’ (in)efficiency: Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information about ana-
lysts? The results in this paper show that strategic – but otherwise uninformed – financial
analysts are able to ‘manipulate’ markets, by exploiting agents’ uncertainty regarding their
true ability. To this end, we combine elements from two established strands of the economics
literature: the market microstructure literature, which examines the ways in which financial
markets’ working processes determine price formation and trading behavior, and the repu-
tation in repeated games literature, whose concern is the study of continuing relationships
(see Vives (2012) and Mailath and Samuelson (2013) for recent and detailed surveys of these
vast and rich literatures). We add to the first strand by modelling explicitly the provision of
information by a strategic financial analyst. We contribute to the second strand by studying
a setting in which exogenous private signals provide the short-run players of our model with
noisy information concerning the realized type of the long-run player. Recent contributions
by Wiseman (2009) and Hu (2014) explore related but crucially distinct settings, in which
exogenous public signals are observed regarding the true type of the long-run player.14
Our paper is related to the literature on social learning, whereby Bayes-rational individuals
learn sequentially from the discrete actions of others; early contributions include Banerjee
12To the best of our knowledge, no other paper makes predictions about the rate of recommendations of
financial analysts.
13See, e.g., Michaely and Womack (2005) for empirical evidence of this phenomenon.
14See also Section 4 for a detailed discussion of our results in relation to the seminal papers of Benabou and
Laroque (1992) and Cripps et al. (2004).
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(1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), and Smith and Sørensen (2000). However, two crucial
differences distinguish our paper from the aforementioned. One, information about assets is
mediated in our model by another strategic player (the analyst). Two, there is no herding in
our model. Investors ignore their private information not because they herd on the actions
of others, but because the recommendations of the analyst provide a window of opportunity
to make profits. The multidimensional nature of uncertainty is here key, relating our paper
to Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011). In our model, the first layer of
uncertainty is related to asset fundamentals. The second layer, on the other hand, pertains
to the quality of information accumulated concerning the true values of assets. This, and the
fact that information is provided by an analyst, distinguishes our paper from those above.
Whereas the amount of empirical work on financial analysts is enormous, theoretical con-
tributions are relatively few.15 Notable exceptions include Admati and Pfleiderer (1986),
Benabou and Laroque (1992), Trueman (1994), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006). Admati
and Pfleiderer (1986) examine a monopolistic analyst who, in order to overcome the dilution
in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices, may prefer to sell
noisier versions of the information he actually has. There is no uncertainty about the ability
of the analyst in that model. Similarly, the paper by Benabou and Laroque (1992) studies
an altogether different problem than ours. All analysts are informed, but engage in insider
trading and have therefore strong short-run incentives to deceive the market. In Trueman
(1994) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006), good and bad analysts coexist, but trade plays no
role (there are no traders). Moreover, public information about underlying assets is plentiful:
the asset’s true value is observed at the end of a period.16
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. Section 3 analyses
the short run, and Section 4 the medium and long run. Section 5 extends the model to analyze
the role played by the volatility of assets, to derive empirical implications, and to demonstrate
the robustness of our results to more general specifications. Proofs not included in the text are
presented in an appendix. We discuss further extensions of the model in an online-appendix.
15The paper by Spiegler (2006) studies, in a different context, a market for quacks. There is no uncertainty
about the ability of the expert, and agents are boundedly rational.
16The related literature on ‘reputational herding’ (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Dasgupta and Prat, 2008)
investigates a separate issue, namely learning about the ability of fund managers (viz. investors).
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2 Basic model
The basic model has the following broad features. Time is discrete. There is one long-run
player (the analyst) and an infinite sequence of short-run players (the investors).17 Each
period, a new investor is given the option to trade an asset of unknown value based on a
recommendation from the analyst. The analyst may be a pundit or a quack. A pundit’s
recommendations are correlated with the asset’s true value, but a quack is uninformed and
makes strategic recommendations with a view to maximize his reputation. Each investor
possesses a piece of information concerning the true type of the analyst. We now lay out the
details and notation of this model.
Assets and Financial Analyst. Let A denote a finite set of assets, with i.i.d. (fixed)
fundamental values {θi}i∈A. The fundamental values have mean zero and realizations in
{−1, 1}.18 Each period t nature publicly selects, uniformly at random, one asset in A to be
traded during that period.19 Let ι(t) denote the asset selected. Whenever it is unlikely to
create confusion, we shorten notation by using θt instead of θι(t) to indicate the fundamental
value of the asset being traded during period t.
Each period t, the analyst makes a recommendation concerning ι(t). We let rt ∈ {−1, 1}
denote the recommendation made in period t. The analyst is either informed or uninformed
(‘good’ or ‘bad’); τ denotes the analyst’s true type: τ = G if he is good, τ = B if he is bad.
His type is drawn at the beginning of the game, fixed henceforth, and known to himself only:
τ = G with probability λ0 ∈ (0, 1), and τ = B with complementary probability 1 − λ0. The
parameter λ0 defines the reputation of the analyst at the beginning of the game.
The informed analyst makes recommendations correlated with the true asset values:20
P(rt = θt|τ = G) = φ,
17The market microstructure is a dealer model adapted from Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
18As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), one may think of θi as the expected sum of discounted dividend
payments, where the dividend dit in period t takes a value in {−1, 0, 1}. The frequency ϕi of dividend
payments, and the relative frequency of high/low dividends then together determine θi. As ϕi → 0, public
information about θi vanishes. See also the online appendix for a model with public information about assets’
fundamental values.
19This assumption is made for simplicity. Alternative assumptions complicate the analysis but leave the
main results unchanged. For instance, the investor in period t could choose ι(t), or the analyst.
20In the terminology of the reputation literature, the informed analyst is a behavior type. Implicit in our
formulation is the assumption that the good analyst receives a sequence of signals correlated with the assets’
true values, and commits to reveal those signals truthfully. In Rudiger and Vigier (2014) we allow the good
analyst to be strategic as well, and show that there is an equilibrium in which he is truthful.
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φ ∈ (1/2, 1). The recommendations of the good analyst are conditionally independent across
time periods.
The bad analyst knows the information publicly available, but nothing more than that, and
makes strategic recommendations with a view to maximize his reputation next period.21 The
analyst’s reputation is updated using all public information (we later describe the updating
process).22
Investors. A new investor arrives to the market each period.23 The investor knows
all public information (later specified in details), and two more pieces of information: the
recommendation from the analyst, rt, and a signal st ∈ {0, 1} of the analyst’s true ability
distributed according to24
P(st = 0|τ = G) = 1− π,
P(st = 0|τ = B) = 1.
These signals are conditionally independent across investors. The parameter π captures the
precision of the signal st. If π were zero then investors would always follow the recommenda-
tions made. We rule out this trivial and uninteresting scenario, by assuming π > 0. Observe
too that if π = 1 then each investor knows the true type of the analyst.25
An investor is of one of two types, defining his motives for trade. With probability µ ∈ (0, 1)
investor t is a speculator, maximizing expected profits from trade. With remaining probability
1−µ investor t is a liquidity trader, trading for exogenous motives unrelated to profits. Investor
types are independent across time periods. A liquidity trader buys, abstains or sells the asset
with probability 1/3 each. We let yt ∈ {a, n, b} denote the trade of investor t: yt = a if he
buys the asset, yt = n if he abstains, and yt = b if he chooses to sell the asset.
26
21This assumption is relaxed in Section 5.3 where we show that our results hold, qualitatively, when the
analyst maximizes the expected discounted sum of future income, and income in a given period is an increasing
function of the analyst’s reputation.
22Chen et al. (2005) find that the market’s response to analysts’ recommendations is consistent with investors
learning about analysts’ forecasting ability in a Bayesian fashion as more observations of past recommendations
become available.
23As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) investors are short-lived, for tractability.
24More general signal structures are considered in the online appendix.
25As indicated earlier, we remain largely agnostic in this paper about the source of the information summa-
rized in st. At any rate, we make no assumption about the strength of the signal st, other than π > 0.
26As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) the size of trades is irrelevant, since speculators are risk neutral. It is













Figure 1: Timing within period t
Timing. The timing of the game within each period is as follows (c.f. Figure 1). The
asset ι(t) is first determined. The analyst then makes his recommendation, rt. Investor t
observes rt, and chooses whether or not to follow this recommendation given the bid and ask
prices posted.27 This investor then leaves the market. The recommendation rt and trade yt
become known publicly when the period ends. This timing assumption is crucial, but reflects
a real-life feature: analyst recommendations are first disclosed to client investors before being
publicized (see, e.g., Michaely and Womack (2005)).28 The market then revises its beliefs,
and updates accordingly the prices posted for the next period.
Some notation is useful. We let Ht denote the public information at the beginning of
period t:
Ht := {Rt−1,Yt−1, It},
where Rt−1 := (r0, ..., rt−1), Yt−1 := (y0, ..., yt−1), and It := (ι0, ..., ιt).
We let Pt(·) := P(·|Ht) denote the probability operator conditional on Ht, and Et[·] :=
E[·|Ht]. The reputation of the analyst at time t, λt, is defined as the probability that the
analyst is informed, given all public information at the beginning of period t:
λt := Pt(τ = G).
The (Bayesian) reputation updating equation is
λt+1(rt, yt) :=
λtPt(rt, yt|G)
λtPt(rt, yt|G) + (1− λt)Pt(rt, yt|B)
. (1)
27To avoid unnecessary cluttering, we do not model market makers explicitly in this paper. Bid and ask
prices are specified in (2).
28In fact, powerful investors typically become aware of analysts’ recommendations before
these are even disclosed to clients. See, e.g., http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/09/business/
blackrock-agrees-to-stop-pursuing-nonpublic-views.html, or Rudiger and Vigier (2015) for a
related theoretical study.
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Strategies. The strategic players of our model are (i) the analyst of type τ = B, and
(ii) the speculators. The vector σHt denotes the strategy of the uninformed analyst in period
t given history Ht, with σrHt indicating the probability of recommending r. The vector ξHt
denotes a speculator’s strategy in period t given Ht, with ξyHt(rt, st) denoting the probability
that he takes action y having observed recommendation rt and signal st. To shorten notation,
and when this is unlikely to create confusion, we will use σt, ξt instead of σHt , ξHt
.
Equilibrium. Prices are assumed competitive, reflecting all information available pub-
licly at the time of trade. This includes the trade order itself, and the behavior of all strategic
players:
pyt = Et[θt|yt = y; ξt, σt]. (2)
The structure of the game described above is common knowledge. A competitive market










maximizing expected profits for
speculators and expected reputation for the analyst of type τ = B, with prices given by (2).










constitute a competitive market equi-
librium if and only if
• ξat (rt, st) > 0⇒ Et[θt|rt, st;σt] ≥ pat , with pat given by (2).
• ξbt (rt, st) > 0⇒ Et[θt|rt, st;σt] ≤ pbt, with pbt given by (2).
• Et[θt|rt, st;σt] > pat ⇒ ξat (rt, st) = 1, with pat given by (2).
• Et[θt|rt, st;σt] < pbt ⇒ ξbt (rt, st) = 1, with pbt given by (2).
• σrt > 0⇒ r ∈ arg maxrt Et[λt+1(rt, yt)|τ = B;σt, ξt], with λt+1(rt, yt) given by (1).
Part one (resp. part two) says that speculators do not buy the asset (resp. sell the asset)
if they expect to lose money by doing so. Part three (resp. part four) says that speculators
always buy the asset (resp. sell the asset) if by doing so they expect to make strictly positive
profits. Part five says that an analyst of type τ = B only issues a recommendation if no other
recommendation (on average) yields higher reputation next period.
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3 The short run
We explore in this section the basic workings of our model and show that the market gets
trapped in the short run when the analyst is reputable, failing to properly aggregate investors’
private information concerning the former’s ability.
Let θGt denote asset ι(t)’s expected value in period t, assuming the analyst is informed.
Let θGt (r) denote the corresponding expected value, where we augment the information set
with the recommendation made in period t. Thus
θGt := Et[θt|τ = G],
θGt (r) := Et[θt|rt = r, τ = G].
Let qrt be the probability that the informed analyst recommends r in period t,















Consider next the speculators. An investor possesses two pieces of information with which to
make profits: the latest recommendation, and his private signal of the analyst’s ability. Let
vt(r, s) denote the valuation of an investor with recommendation r and ability signal s. An
investor with st = 1 assigns probability 1 to the informed analyst. This yields
vt(1, 1) = θ
G
t (1),
vt(−1, 1) = θGt (−1).
An investor with st = 0, on the other hand, updates his assessment of the analyst in two ways:
first according to the likelihood (1 − π)/1 of a negative ability signal, and second according










to the likelihood qrtt /σ
rt















t (1− π) + (1− λt)σ−t
θGt (−1).
We next examine the ranking of the valuations derived above. Much of our model’s interest
springs from the fact that rather than being fixed, the ranking of the valuations – and, by
way of consequence, the information reflected in prices – typically evolves over time. To help
fix ideas we focus in what follows on histories where θGt (−1) > 0, which we will refer to as
cases of ‘bullish’ history.30
Claim 4 in the appendix establishes that, if history is bullish, then in any equilibrium:
vt(−1, 0) < min{vt(−1, 1), vt(1, 0)}, (3)
vt(1, 1) > max{vt(−1, 1), vt(1, 0)}. (4)
The intuition is straightforward. An investor with (rt = −1, st = 0) discounts the bullish
history and receives a recommendation to sell the asset. At the other extreme, an investor
with (rt = 1, st = 1) endorses the bullish history and receives a recommendation to buy the
asset. Following (3)-(4), these investors respectively have the lowest and highest valuations.
We deduce from the former inequalities that, in equilibrium, a speculator with (rt = 1, st =
1) (resp. (rt = −1, st = 0)) must buy the asset (resp. sell the asset) with probability 1. Spec-
ulators with (rt = 1, st = 0) or (rt = −1, st = 1), on the other hand, face a dilemma. A
speculator with (rt = 1, st = 0), for instance, discounts the bullish history, but is simulta-
neously advised to buy the asset. In general, his trading decision will thus vary according
to the relative weight attached to these two factors. The implications of his decision, how-
ever, are crucial for the transmission of information concerning the analyst. If he abstains
from buying, the market will be able to distinguish him (statistically) from the investor with
(rt = 1, st = 1), and thereby learn something about st and hence the analyst’s true type. If
he always buys the asset, however, the market will learn nothing concerning the analyst.
Henceforth, we will say that the market is trapped at time t if, in the equilibrium considered
and given the history, the market fails to aggregate any information about the true type of
30This situation will occur anytime the total number of ‘buy’ recommendations on asset ι(t) is at least two
more than the total number of ‘sell’ recommendations on that asset.
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the analyst during that period.
Definition 2. The market is trapped at time t if
Pt(λt+1 = λt) = 1. (5)
Extending the previous definition to focus first on the short run, we will say that the
market is trapped for T initial periods if in the equilibrium considered P(λT = λ0) = 1. Our
first theorem shows that the market will be trapped for an arbitrarily long time provided the
initial reputation of the analyst is good enough.
The basic intuition is the following. Holding fixed the strategy of speculators, better
reputation increases (i) the expected quality of advice and (ii) the amount of information
revealed by trades. We show that the first effect dominates, such that – in equilibrium –
better reputation increases average foregone profits from ignoring a recommendation. Hence
when reputation is high, so too are foregone profits. Above a threshold reputation speculators
must then choose, in equilibrium, to follow all advice stemming from the analyst.
Theorem 1. If µ < 1 and π < 1 then there exists a strictly increasing sequence {λ̂T0 }T∈N with
limit 1, such that the following property holds: the market is trapped, in any equilibrium, for
T initial periods if and only if λ0 ≥ λ̂T0 . The greater the mass of speculators (µ) and/or the
greater the precision of speculators’ information (π) the higher λ̂T0 , for all T .
The occurrence of a trap hinges upon three simple conditions: (a) non-zero mass of liquidity
traders (µ < 1), (b) imperfectly informed investors (π < 1), and (c) good analyst reputation
(λ0 ≥ λ̂T0 ). Condition (a) bounds the elasticity of prices. Consider a speculator with a
positive recommendation, looking to buy the asset. In the absence of liquidity traders, a
‘lemons’ situation ensues in which the market unravels: prices adjust, and only the speculator
with the highest valuation would ever buy the asset. But a speculator’s trade order would then
reveal his information of the analyst since, as we saw earlier, a speculator with (rt = 1, st = 1)
always has the highest valuation. Condition (a) is thus necessary for the market to get
trapped.31 Conditions (b) and (c) are complementary. When they hold, speculators willingly
attribute negative ability signals to sheer luck. This allows them to disregard their information
concerning the analyst, and blindly follow the recommendations made.32
31When µ = 1 there is also a ‘no trade’ equilibrium in which the market breaks down, and a trap trivially
ensues. Condition (a) is necessary for the result to hold in all equilibria.
32The break-down of learning about the expert’s ability occurring in our model is related to the market
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The results on comparative statics are intuitive. The less the mass of liquidity traders,
the more responsive the prices to the trade orders. This in turn discourages speculators from
ignoring their signals of the analyst’s ability, preventing thereby the occurrence of reputational
traps. Similarly, an increase in the parameter π raises the precision of investors’ information
regarding the analyst, thus discouraging the former from ignoring that information.
The remainder of this section elaborates the various steps leading to Theorem 1, and
derives closed-form expressions of the thresholds {λ̂T0 }T∈N defined in the statement of the
theorem. We first construct an equilibrium in which, when the reputation of the analyst is
good, the market fails to aggregate information about τ from one period to the next. The
second step is to show that the threshold reputation found in step one is in fact ‘uniform’
across all equilibria, i.e. when reputation is above the threshold then the market must fail to
learn about τ , in all equilibria. This step is hard; the reader who wishes to skip the details of
the analysis can go directly to the next section.
Two channels in our model transmit information in equilibrium to the market about the
analyst’s true type. First, speculators’ decision to follow or not the analyst’s advice. Second,
recommendations themselves. Information about the analyst’s ability is transmitted through
the recommendations because the extent to which speculators follow the analyst’s advice will
in general not be uniform across the different possible recommendations. Therefore, as the
bad analyst wishes to minimize the information channeled regarding his type, he will favor
the recommendations most likely to be followed by the speculators. Thus, in equilibrium the
recommendations themselves will generally be informative about the true type of the analyst.
The next definitions help formalize the distinction made between the two channels identi-
fied above.
Definition 3. Given trading strategy ξ
t
, say that screening is efficient if trades fully reveal
private signals of the analyst’s ability, in the following sense: ξyt (r, 1) > 0 ⇒ ξ
y
t (r, 0) = 0,
∀ y, r.
break-down occurring in Ely and Välimäki (2003). In their model a series of Principals sequentially interact
with a single Agent, whose type (good or bad) is unknown to the Principals. In some cases, the good Agent
should take a given action, but that action is also the preferred action of a bad Agent. To distinguish himself,
the good Agent then favors the inefficient action, but by doing so he kills the Principals’ incentive to hire him.
In both that paper and ours, the crux lies in the failure of each Principal (viz. each speculator) to internalize
the benefits to others from learning about the type of the Agent (viz. the analyst). However the break-down
of learning takes opposite forms in the two papers: In Ely and Välimäki (2003) learning breaks down because
the Principals stop ‘trading’; by contrast learning breaks down (viz. a reputational trap occurs) in our paper
because the Principals trade with probability one.
14
Definition 4. Given trading strategy ξ
t
, say that screening breaks down if trades are
uninformative about private signals of the analyst’s ability, in the following sense: screening
breaks down on the positive side (resp., negative side) if there exist y ∈ {a, n, b} such that
ξyt (1, 1) = 1 = ξ
y
t (1, 0) (resp., such that ξ
y
t (−1, 1) = 1 = ξ
y
t (−1, 0)). Say that screening breaks
down if it does so on both the positive and the negative side.
Suppose next an equilibrium and history Ht exist such that the market is trapped at time
t. In this equilibrium and given that history, the market fails to aggregate information about
τ during period t. Observe then that screening must break down during that period. If it did
not, then the investor’s trade in period t would act as a (noisy) signal of information st, and
(5) would not hold. The next observation establishes the converse of this result.
Observation 1. Consider an equilibrium and history Ht where screening breaks down in
period t. Then (5) holds in this equilibrium, given that history.
To see why the observation is true, suppose for the sake of contradiction that (5) does not
hold. The recommendation made in period t must then be informative about the analyst, i.e.
the equilibrium must be such that σt 6= qt. Let r and r







In that case (1) yields λt+1(r, y) < λt and λt+1(r
′, y) > λt, for all y. Recommending r
′
is thus unambiguously more advantageous for the uninformed analyst. This is inconsistent
with the uninformed analyst maximizing his expected reputation, and so (5) must hold, by
contradiction.
Observation 1 stresses the strategic implications of our model. Consider for comparison
the case of an uninformed analyst mechanically (uniformly) randomizing between buy and sell
recommendations, i.e. behaving according to (σ−t , σ
+
t ) = (1/2, 1/2) regardless of the history.
Suppose the history were bullish: the market would then expect the informed analyst to
be bullish too. But then, an analyst who emits buy and sell recommendations with equal
probability will (on average) reveal himself by appearing bearish, comparatively. Thus, in
that case, in contrast to our model, screening may break down and yet some information be
conveyed in equilibrium to the market about the true type of the analyst.
We now ask: When would speculators prefer ignoring their information concerning the
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λ̂(Ht) = max{λ̂+(Ht), λ̂−(Ht)}.
Notice that the right-hand side of these expressions are functions of Ht through the θGt ’s.33
Lemma 1 shows that if in a given period reputation is above the threshold λ̂(Ht) then an
equilibrium can be found in which the market learns nothing about τ during that period. The
proof is simple, and helps illustrate the underlying forces at work; we therefore keep it in the
text.
Lemma 1. If in some equilibrium, given history Ht, λt ≥ λ̂(Ht) then an equilibrium exists in
which (5) holds, given Ht. Moreover, λ̂(Ht) is the smallest number satisfying this property.
Proof of Lemma 1: Continue assuming history is bullish. We noted earlier that when
history is bullish then, in equilibrium, a speculator with (rt = −1, st = 0) sells the asset with
probability 1. Similarly, a speculator with (rt = 1, st = 1) buys the asset with probability
1. Screening thus breaks down if and only if (a) speculators with (rt, st) = (1, 0) buy with
probability 1, while (b) speculators with (rt, st) = (−1, 1) sell with probability 1. We next
derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for (a) and (b) to hold in equilibrium.
Given competitive prices – and in view of Observation 1 – (a) is an equilibrium if
λt(1− π)q+t
λt(1− π)q+t + (1− λt)q+t
· θGt (1) ≥
γq+t
γq+t + 1− γ
· λtθGt (1) +
1− γ
γq+t + 1− γ
· p0t ,
where γ := µ
µ+(1−µ)/3 and p
0
t := Et[θt]. The left-hand side of this inequality is vt(1, 0), when
σ+t = q
+
t . The right-hand side is obtained as follows. With probability µq
+
t investor t is a
speculator observing rt = 1. With probability (1 − µ)/3, he is a liquidity trader looking to
33Note too that, given a bullish history, λ̂−(Ht) ∈ (0, 1) and is, moreover, independent of π. By contrast
λ̂+(Ht) is strictly monotonic in π, tending to 1 as π tends to 1, and to −∞ as π tends to 0. Thus we can find
π̂(Ht) such that λ̂(Ht) = λ̂−(Ht) if π ≤ π̂(Ht), and λ̂(Ht) = λ̂+(Ht) otherwise.
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buy the asset. In the former case the expected asset value is λtθ
G
t (1). In the latter case, it is




t , that the inequality above
is satisfied for λt ≥ λ̂+(Ht).
Similarly, for (b) to be an equilibrium requires
θGt (−1) ≤
γq−t
γq−t + 1− γ
· λtθGt (−1) +
1− γ
γq−t + 1− γ
· p0t .
Substituting again p0t = λtθ
G
t , this inequality is satisfied for λt ≥ λ̂−(Ht). The proof is similar
for other histories.

Our next result shows that λ̂(Ht) is in fact a uniform bound, in the following sense:
Lemma 2. Consider an equilibrium and history Ht such that λt ≥ λ̂(Ht). Then (5) holds in
this equilibrium, given that history.
The proof of the lemma contains various steps. We here sketch the main arguments.34 Let
E1 denote the trapped equilibrium of Lemma 1, and suppose another equilibrium exists, E2
say. We proceed to analyze the second equilibrium.
We omit in this discussion the time subscripts, to avoid cluttering notation. Denote by σ1
and σ2 the strategy played by the uninformed analyst in these equilibria, respectively. First,
suppose that σ+2 > σ
+
1 . The expected reputation from issuing a positive recommendation
must then be lower in E2 than in E1: one, a positive recommendation is more likely to be
sent by the bad analyst in E2 than in E1; two, there can be no less screening in E2 than in
E1, since in E1 screening altogether breaks down.
The key step of the proof is then as follows. We first show that the less often a recommen-
dation is issued by the uninformed analyst, the less speculators gain from screening it.35 Thus:
since no screening occurs in E1, and σ−2 < σ
−
1 , screening must break down on the negative
side in E2. But then the expected reputation from issuing a sell recommendation is greater
in E2 than it is in E1. Combining this observation with our first remark above finally shows
that in E2, the expected reputation from recommending rt = −1 must be greater than the
expected reputation from recommending rt = 1. But this is inconsistent with equilibrium.
34A detailed proof is given in the appendix.
35The statement is intuitive and indeed, if prices are fixed, proving it is trivial. The difficulty comes from
the fact that prices are competitive in our model.
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These arguments thus establish σ1 = σ2. The proof of Lemma 2 is concluded by showing
that in E2, screening breaks down too, and that prices in the two equilibria are identical. The
two equilibria considered thus coincide in that period, given that history.
A proof of Theorem 1 is obtained by combining Lemmas 1 and 2, and exploiting certain
regularity properties of the thresholds λ̂(Ht) with respect to the history of recommendations.
The details are in the appendix.
4 The medium and long run
We examine in this section the medium and long-run properties of our model. We first establish
that the reputational traps uncovered in Section 3 are transient events. We then show that
even if it exits a trap, the market may be trapped again at a later date. In spite of this, the
section’s main result shows that the market learns the ability of the analyst in the long run.
The occurrence of reputational traps naturally places a question mark over the possibility
to learn τ and, in turn, over prices’ convergence to the fundamental asset values. However,
we next argue that whenever the market is trapped, a countervailing force starts working.
Recall that there are two layers of uncertainty in the market we model: uncertainty about the
ability of the analyst, τ , and uncertainty about the asset values, {θi}i∈A. When the market
is trapped, it stops learning τ , but goes on learning {θi}i∈A. This transforms gradually the
incentives of speculators. As a result:36
Proposition 1. Reputational traps are transient events, almost surely, in any competitive
market equilibrium.
The basic intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When the market is trapped, the
uninformed analyst can hide his type insofar as he pretends to be good. If he were good,
however, then prices would converge to the assets’ true values. This forces the analyst of type
τ = B to make prices converge too, or else lose his reputation.37 However, as prices converge,
speculators tend to gain less from trading based on the recommendations and, all the while,
stand to gain more from arbitrage based on their information of the analyst’s true ability. To
be sure, the signal st determines the ‘discount factor’ of all past recommendations. Hence, the
more information contained in the public history, the more critical the signal of the analyst’s
36The formal arguments for this proposition are contained in the proof of Theorem 2.
37Effectively, the uninformed analyst makes his recommendations persistent in an attempt to pool with the
informed analyst. A related mechanism is studied in Prendergast and Stole (1996).
18
true type. An overwhelming dominance of ‘buy’ recommendations, say, will push prices up
toward their highest value. A speculator with a negative ability signal on the other hand
will see his valuations of the assets revert toward the unconditional mean (i.e zero). Hence,
the higher the prices the more the speculator will view the assets as overvalued. As prices
approach their upper bound, this will induce him to trade against historical trends (i.e. sell
the assets), independently of the recommendations made. By acting as contrarians (relative
to the history), speculators thus eventually release information about the true type of the
analyst. This establishes that the reputational traps uncovered in Section 3 are transient
events.
Perhaps unfortunately, we now show that anytime one trap ends, the market will with
positive probability re-enter another one.38
Proposition 2. Assume A has two elements at least. In any equilibrium, given any history,
the probability that the market will be trapped some time in the future is positive (strictly).
The arguments establishing Proposition 2 reverse those used for Proposition 1. If the
analyst becomes sufficiently reputable, then the information incorporated in his current rec-
ommendation will swamp that contained in a speculator’s signal of the analyst’s ability. Each
period, a threshold exists such that if reputation is above that threshold, the market will be
trapped (Lemmas 1 and 2). Furthermore, this threshold depends on past recommendations
made on that period’s asset only. Random movements in reputation related to trades in other
assets ensure that it is always possible that reputation will move above this threshold.
We go on to show that in the basic model – and in spite of the last result – the market
learns the true ability of the analyst in the long run.39 The key to our second theorem is to
show that almost surely screening becomes efficient eventually.40
Theorem 2. The market almost surely learns the analyst’s true type in the long run, in any
equilibrium. In particular:
1. Conditional on type τ = G, prices converge almost surely to the true asset values.
2. Conditional on type τ = B, prices converge almost surely to zero.
38The case where the market has a single asset is unresolved. We have neither been able to prove nor
disprove the result in that case.
39In the model we explore, small frictions due to transaction costs would not affect learning, since analyst
recommendations here accumulate whether or not trade occurs. This observation remains true even when the
strategic analyst is given the option not to make recommendations (see Section 5.2).
40This intermediary step is shown in Claim 9 of the appendix.
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Our analysis of the long run provides interesting complementary insights relative to the
seminal work of Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Cripps et al. (2004). In both papers, a
long-run player is faced with a sequence of short-run players. The long-run player is either a
commitment type – committed to playing action A, say – or a strategic type, with a choice of
playing action D. The long-run player’s action is unobserved, but generates a public signal y
distributed according to FA if he takes action A and FD if he takes action D.41 The short-run
players’ best response to A is α, say, but (A,α) is not a Nash equilibrium of the stage-game.
As FD 6= FA, the strategic type thus eventually reveals himself by deviating to play action D,
when his reputation is good enough. By contrast, in our paper (A,α) is a Nash equilibrium
of the stage-game, when the reputation of the analyst is good enough. In those cases, it is
prices’ convergence which ultimately ensures that (A,α) does not remain a Nash equilibrium.42
Learning about analysts is thus inseparable from the convergence of asset prices. This key and
novel feature of our model has important implications. It underlies, for instance, Proposition
3 of the next section, where we show that if asset fundamentals are sufficiently volatile then
learning about analysts will collapse in the short and in the long run.
5 Some extensions of the basic model
We extend in this section the basic model along three broad directions, with a view to ex-
plore some issues related to the central theme of our paper. First, Section 5.1 examines the
impact of volatile fundamentals. Section 5.2 endogenizes the decision to make new recom-
mendations. Section 5.3, finally, investigates the effects from expanding the time horizon of
the uninformed analyst. Other, more trivial, extensions of the basic model are developed in
an online appendix.43
41In general, the distribution of y may also depend on the actions of the short-run players.
42In the narrative of this paragraph, the reader should visualize the situation as follows. The long-run player
of our model is the analyst. The commitment type is τ = G, and the commitment action A is q
t
. The strategic
type is τ = B, and his deviating action D is σt 6= qt. The short-run players of our model are the speculators.
Their best response α to strategy A when the reputation of the analyst is good enough, is to blindly follow the
recommendations of the analyst. So when reputation is high, (A,α) is a Nash equilibrium of the stage-game
(this is Lemma 1): given that the bad analyst ‘mimics’ the good one then speculators want to follow blindly
the recommendations; and given that screening breaks down the bad analyst then wants to ‘imitate’ the good
one (this is Observation 1). As prices converge, α stops being a best response to A in our model and so, a
fortiori, (A,α) does not remain a Nash equilibrium of the stage-game.
43This includes: adding public information about the asset’s true value (e.g. dividend payments), allowing
more general structures for the private information of investors, and adding other assets and/or analysts to
the model.
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5.1 Fundamental volatility and learning analyst ability
We assumed fixed fundamental values in the basic model. We now show that relaxing this
assumption worsens considerably the market’s ability to learn the true type of the analyst in
the long run, expanding thereby the scope of our paper’s main insights.44
The intuition is simple. With fixed fundamentals, whenever the market is trapped histor-
ical information embedded in prices eventually takes precedence over the current recommen-
dation of the analyst. When this occurs, investors start turning to their private information
with a view to evaluate the credence of this historical information. At that point, the market
stops being trapped (c.f. Section 4). With volatile fundamentals by contrast, current recom-
mendations may continue to be highly informative relative to historical information. This in
turn, allows the analyst to sustain his grip on the market.
The next proposition considers the limit case, in which {θι(t)}t are i.i.d. asset values with
mean zero, and realizations in {−1, 1}. While evidently unrealistic, the model allows us to




Proposition 3. With i.i.d. fundamental values, the market’s ability to learn the true type of
the analyst collapses, and reputation is (uniformly) bounded above. There exists ε > 0 such
that, for all Ht and in any equilibrium, λt < λ̂+ ε < 1, and
P(limλt = 1|τ = G) = 0
P(limλt = 0|τ = B) < 1.
Proposition 3 underscores the importance of the remarks made on the role played by
prices in bringing about learning of the analyst’s true type. When asset fundamentals are very
volatile, prices have no time to accumulate historic information, and the ‘value’ of speculators’
information about analyst ability remains constant. In that case, if and when the analyst
gains sufficient reputation, speculators will follow his recommendations always, resulting in
an indefinite trap.
44Introducing fundamental volatility effectively prolongs the influence of the short-run effects uncovered in
Section 3.
45This simple model is studied, e.g., in Benabou and Laroque (1992).
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5.2 New recommendations and prices’ behavior
We endogenize in this subsection the decision of the analyst to make a recommendation or
not, and explore the implications of our model regarding trading activity and prices’ behavior
over time. We show that trading activity peaks when the market is trapped, and that the
occurrence of reputational traps can explain sudden and large price movements. Finally, we
look at how our model is consistent with the empirical fact that previous recommendations
may exert a contemporaneous effect on prices.
We have so far assumed that the good analyst receives each period a signal correlated
with the asset’s true value. This has forced the bad analyst to make recommendations each
period in order to avoid losing his reputation. In practice, naturally, even a good analyst may
in some periods fail to possess new information concerning the asset. Enhancing the model
in this way opens up important new strategic considerations for the bad analyst, who may
now decide in any given period whether or not to make a recommendation at all. Avoiding
recommendations is attractive insofar as it minimizes information released about one’s true
type, but may in equilibrium arise suspicion regarding the ability of the analyst. We next
explore the implications of this trade-off.
Formally, the basic model is modified as follows. We focus on a single asset, to save on
notation. Each period the analyst now makes a choice rt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, where rt = 0 is used
to indicate the absence of a recommendation in period t. The good analyst is informed (i.e.
makes a recommendation) on average half of the time, so that
P(rt = 0|τ = G) = 1/2
P(rt = θ|τ = G) = φ/2,
where φ ∈ (1/2, 1). The rest of the model is as described in Section 2, except that now if no
recommendation is made in period t, then trader t remains uninformed about the true type
of the analyst.46 It is precisely this feature which makes it attractive for the bad analyst to
avoid making a recommendation.
We begin by showing that the rate at which the analyst makes recommendations varies
46To be sure, the absence of a recommendation may in itself be informative in equilibrium about the true
type of the analyst. But st is unobserved unless rt 6= 0. This assumption is justified by the fact that the quality
of analyst reports is informative about analyst ability, and an analyst who does not make a recommendation
needs not write a report either.
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with time.47 The intuition is as follows. So long as speculators screen the recommendations,
the uninformed analyst will prefer to avoid making recommendations, so as to minimize the
information released concerning his true ability. In a reputational trap however, the analyst
knows that the market will follow his recommendations with probability one. He then needs
not fear making new recommendations. The rate of recommendations thus rises when the
market is trapped.
Observation 2. The rate of recommendations varies with time, reaching a maximum when
the market is trapped.
We next record an important implication of the former observation. The arrival of new
recommendations evidently provides speculators with incentives to trade based on the infor-
mation provided by the analyst. Thus more recommendations typically spur more trade. The
probability that a recommendation induces trade however, is normally less than one, unless
namely the market finds itself in a reputational trap. We hence obtain:
Observation 3. Trading activity varies with time, and peaks when the market is trapped.
We turn next to the implications of our model regarding prices’ behavior. Let dt :=∣∣∑t−1
0 rt′
∣∣ record the ‘net’ amount of information concerning the asset accumulated up to
period t.
Observation 4. The greater the information accumulated about the asset, the more sensitive






Observation 4 allows us to see why the occurrence of reputational traps can explain sudden
and large price movements. As the market gets trapped it stops aggregating information
about the analyst, but goes on accumulating recommendations stemming from the analyst
(at an increased rate moreover, given Observation 2). All information accumulated during
the reputational trap is then re-evaluated at once the instant the market exits the trap, and
learning about the analyst’s true type starts operating again. Interestingly, rather than being
caused by the release of new information (as in, e.g., Lee (1998)), the large price ‘swings’
depicted here results from the simultaneous depreciation of all past accumulated information.
47Strictly speaking, only the rate at which the bad analyst makes new recommendations varies with time.
23
We complete this section with an important remark. Prices take time in the model we
explore to fully incorporate the recommendations of the analyst. Here, a recommendation is
first incorporated ‘at a discount’, and later adapted according to the evolution of the analyst’s
reputation.48 Past recommendations thus affect prices contemporaneously, so long as the
market goes on learning the true ability of the analyst.
Observation 5. All past recommendations have a contemporaneous effect on the price, unless
the market is trapped, in which case only the latest recommendation affects the price.
5.3 Farsighted analyst
We modify here the basic model by relaxing the assumption that the analyst maximizes his
expected reputation one period ahead, and assume instead that the uninformed analyst aims
to maximize the expected discounted flow of his future income, where income in a given
period is an increasing function of the analyst’s reputation in that period. Let δ denote the
discount factor and f(·) an increasing function relating income to reputation. Each period t,
the analyst of type τ = B maximizes Et[
∑∞
s=t+1 δ
s−(t+1)f(λs)|B], where f ′(·) > 0. The basic
model is retrieved by setting δ = 0.
The basic forces inducing screening to break down in the framework we explore are largely
unaffected by the time horizon of the strategic analyst. As a sketch argument, suppose the
uninformed analyst plays σt in period t, and let mt(σ
+
t ) = λtq
+
t + (1 − λt)σ+t . Assuming as
usual a bullish history, screening will break down on the positive side if
λt(1− π)q+t
λt(1− π)q+t + (1− λt)σ+t






t ) + 1− γ




t ) + 1− γ
· p0t .
Recall q+t ≥ 1 − φ > 0. So if π < 1 and µ < 1 (implying γ < 1) then as λt goes to one, the
left-hand side goes to θGt (1), and the right-hand side goes to some strictly convex combination
of θGt (1) and θ
G
t , which is obviously less than θ
G
t (1). Thus, for any σ
+
t there exists a threshold
for λt, above which the highlighted inequality will hold. A uniform threshold is then retrieved
by letting σ+t span [0, 1].
Consider next the effect of the time horizon on the behavior of the strategic analyst. If
screening were constant, i.e. if speculators’ strategies were time-invariant, then an increase
in today’s reputation would induce a first-order stochastic dominance shift of reputation in
48See, e.g., Michaely and Womack (2005) for empirical evidence of such behavior.
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any future period. The objective of the analyst in that case would reduce to maximizing
reputation one period ahead. In the framework we explore, however, the degree of screening
carried out by speculators varies with time. The time horizon will therefore in principle affect
the behavior of the strategic analyst, who may be willing to sacrifice reputation today in order
to reap the benefits from less screening some time in the future.
We now illustrate (informally first, then with a proposition) why these effects are unim-
portant for the qualitative results of our paper. Suppose that the analyst looks forward n
periods, i.e. the analyst cares about his stream of income (and hence, his reputation) starting
from period t+ 1 all the way to period t+ n. Define λ̂k(Rt), k ∈ {1, ..., n}, as follows. First,
set λ̂1(Rt) = λ̂(Rt), the threshold elicited in Lemma 1 of Section 3.49 Set then, recursively,
λ̂k(Rt) = max{λ̂k−1(Rt,+1), λ̂k−1(Rt,−1)}. The idea is the following. If λt ≥ λ̂n(Rt) then
screening will break down in at least the next n periods. But the analyst cares about n peri-
ods only. So if today his reputation is above λ̂n(Rt) then effectively, from his perspective, the
strategy of speculators is time-invariant. This simple example thus suggests how, by raising
appropriately the threshold reputation of the analyst, results and insights obtained in the
basic model do carry over as we extend the time horizon of the strategic analyst.
Finally, we summarize the previous remarks in a formal proposition, and show in addition
that the long-run behavior of the basic model is unaffected by the time horizon of the analyst.
Proposition 4. Let δ ∈ [0, 1), µ < 1, and π < 1. Fix ε > 0. There exists a threshold
reputation λ̂(Ht, δ) such that, in any equilibrium with λt ≥ λ̂(Ht, δ):
Pt
(
|λt+1 − λt| < ε
)
= 1,
given that history. As δ tends to zero, λ̂(Ht, δ) → λ̂(Ht), the threshold reputation elicited in
Lemma 1 of Section 3. Furthermore, in the long run, the market learns τ almost surely in
any equilibrium. In particular:
1. Conditional on type τ = G, prices converge almost surely to the true asset values.
2. Conditional on type τ = B, prices converge almost surely to zero.
Results obtained in the basic model thus approximate well those of the more general
framework considered here.
49Notice that the thresholds from Section 3 are functions of Ht through Rt−1 and It only. For convenience,
we here suppose that there is only one asset and define λ̂(Rt) := λ̂(Ht+1).
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6 Conclusion
Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information concerning financial analysts? We
have uncovered in this paper a market failure previously ignored, by showing that investors’
private information concerning financial analysts is typically not aggregated into prices in the
medium run. This phenomenon – which we coin reputational trap – could allow incompetent
analysts to sustain a good reputation longer than they should, and implies that bad analysts
will tend to cause substantial short-term price fluctuations: in a bullish market, a bad analyst
drives prices up when the market is trapped, inducing sudden price reversals as (and if) the
market eventually learns the true type of the analyst.
We also present several results with regards to the long-run convergence of prices. The
difficulty lies in the manner in which the market provides feedback about analyst ability. Effec-
tively, due to the existence of reputational traps, the market’s feedback about analysts is not
‘bounded away from zero’. It turns out that the driver of convergence in our model is the price
mechanism itself, which ensures that the more information becomes released about an asset,
the more profitable for speculators to screen analysts. However, when assets’ fundamentals
are very volatile then historic information rapidly depreciates. The ‘value’ of speculators’ in-
formation about analysts remains roughly constant, in that case. Such conditions may induce
perpetual, or very long, reputational traps.
This paper offers several avenues for future research, two of which we now discuss. First,
we have assumed that analysts make recommendations on one asset per period, and have
restricted speculators to trading precisely this asset. If we relaxed the choice of asset traded
in period t, interesting effects would ensue. Consider for instance a speculator with st = 1
receiving a recommendation regarding asset ι(t). He would then revalue not just asset ι(t), but
all assets at once, since he now realizes that all previous recommendations were indeed ‘true’.
Thus, the best trade he can make may not be in asset ι(t), but in some other under/overvalued
asset. Second, we have assumed that the analyst is motivated by career concerns. It would
be interesting to know whether and how the conclusions of our paper would change if the
incentives of the analyst were commissions-based instead, i.e. if the objective of the analyst
were to maximize the trading activity.
26
7 Appendix
In order to avoid repeating very similar proofs twice, we will work in this appendix with
the slightly more general model of Section 5.2, i.e. we allow the analyst not to make a
recommendation in a given period.






λet+1(r, σt, ξt) := Et[λt+1(rt = r, yt)|τ = B;σt, ξt].
The parameter γ records the weight of speculators relative to liquidity traders taking any given
action (buy/sell/abstain). The variable p0t is the public valuation at the beginning of period t.
The variable λet+1(r, σt, ξt) finally, denotes the uninformed analyst’s expected reputation next
period from recommending r today, when his strategy is σt and speculators’ strategy is ξt.
We will, wherever possible, drop time subscripts in order to unclutter notation. The
following equilibrium conditions, stating that the uninformed analyst is indifferent between
all recommendations, are easily established using standard arguments:
λe(−1, σ, ξ) = λe(0, σ, ξ) = λe(1, σ, ξ). (8)
7.1 Proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1
We begin with a series of preliminary results. Claims 1-3 establish the intuitive results that
more screening from speculators and more aggressive behavior from the uninformed analyst
induce worse expected reputation for the analyst. Claim 4 orders speculators’ valuations, in
equilibrium. Claims 5 and 6 are instrumental in proving equilibrium uniqueness.
Claim 1. Consider σ such that σr > 0, ∀r.
1. If ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side then λe(1, σ, ξ
1
) ≥ λe(1, σ, ξ
2
),
with strict inequality unless ξ
2
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side too.
2. If ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening on the negative side then λe(−1, σ, ξ
1
) ≥ λe(−1, σ, ξ
2
),
with strict inequality unless ξ
2
entails a break-down of screening on the negative side too.
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Observe next that if ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side then L(y|r =
1, ξ
1
) = 1 for all y. So either ξ
2
entails a break-down of screening on the positive side too or,
conditional on the expert being bad, the distribution of L(y|r = 1, ξ
2
) is a mean-preserving
spread of the distribution of L(y|r = 1, ξ
1
). In the latter case we obtain, by (9) and concavity
of Mσ+ , λ
e(1, σ, ξ
2
) < λe(1, σ, ξ
1
).
The proof of Part 2 of the Claim is similar, and omitted.

Claim 2. If ξ
1
entails a break-down of screening then for any ξ
2
:
1. σ+2 > σ
+
1 ⇒ λe(1, σ1, ξ1) > λ
e(1, σ2, ξ2).
2. σ−2 > σ
−
1 ⇒ λe(−1, σ1, ξ1) > λ
e(−1, σ2, ξ2).
Proof of Claim 2: Using the same notation as in the proof of Claim 1:
λe(1, σ2, ξ2) = E[Mσ+2
(













|r = 1, ξ
2
, B]
= λe(1, σ1, ξ2)
≤ λe(1, σ1, ξ1).
The first inequality follows from the fact that Mσ+2 (x) < Mσ
+
1
(x) for all x. The last inequality
is an application of Claim 1.
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The proof of Part 2 of the Claim is similar, and omitted.







, then λe(r′, σ, ξ) > λe(r, σ, ξ).
Proof of Claim 3: The proof is similar to that of Claim 2 and is therefore omitted.

We next prove equations (3) and (4) of Section 3. Recall that v(r, s) denotes the valuation
of an investor with recommendation r and ability signal s. By extension, v(0) is used to
denote the valuation of an investor without a recommendation.50
50Recall in particular that under the assumptions of Section 5.2, st is unobserved unless rt 6= 0.
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Claim 4. Let θG(−1) > 0. Then, in any equilibrium:
1. v(1, 1) is (strictly) the highest of all valuations.
2. v(−1, 0) is (strictly) the lowest of all valuations.
3. v(−1, 0) < p0 < vt(1, 1).
In particular, in any equilibrium: ξa(1, 1) = 1 and ξb(−1, 0) = 1.
Proof of Claim 4: Part 1 is immediate. We prove the second part. Let (σ, ξ) denote an
arbitrary equilibrium strategy-pair.
Step 1: v(−1, 0) < v(0). Let β(r, s) denote an investor’s updated belief of the analyst’s type
after observing (r, s). We have:
λe(0, σ, ξ) = λe(−1, σ, ξ) > β(−1, 0).
Step 1 now follows, since:
v(−1, 0) = β(−1, 0)θG(−1) < λe(0, σ, ξ)θG(−1) = β(0)θG(−1) < β(0)θG(0) = v(0).
Step 2: v(−1, 0) < v(1, 0). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that v(−1, 0) ≥ v(1, 0).
Then β(−1, 0) > β(1, 0), and so σ−/q− < σ+/q+. But v(−1, 0) ≥ v(1, 0) also implies (using
Step 1) that v(1, 0) is the lowest valuation, in which case ξb(1, 0) = 1. Since ξa(1, 1) = 1 (by
Part 1 of the Claim), then Claim 3 yields λe(1, σ, ξ) < λe(−1, σ, ξ). But this is impossible, in
equilibrium.
To prove part 3 of the claim, note that v(−1, 0) ≥ p0 implies β(−1, 0) > λ. But then
λe(−1, σ, ξ) > λ, which is impossible by (8). That p0 < v(1, 1) is immediate.

Our next result establishes a key step in the proof of Lemma 2.
Claim 5. Let θG(−1) > 0, and Ei, i = 1, 2, two equilibria. Let ∆σr := σr2 − σr1. If ∆σ− < 0,
and ∆σ0,∆σ+ ≥ 0 , then pb1 ≤ pb2.
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Proof of Claim 5: We give here a very general proof of the result. A less abstract (but
longer) proof can be found in Rudiger and Vigier (2014). The proof we give requires some
notation and terminology, which we now define. Let I := {0, ..., n}. Consider a discrete
random variable θ, with realizations {θi}i∈I , θi < θj for i < j, and probability distribution
Gi := P(θ = θi), i ∈ I. Define a signal s by the non-negative weights {Wi(s)}i∈I , where
Wi(s) ≤ Gi, ∀i. Let moreover W (s) :=
∑





θi. Given two signals
s and s′ with Wi(s) + Wi(s
′) ≤ Gi, i ∈ I, define a new signal s + s′ := {Wi(s) + Wi(s′)}i∈I .
Similarly, given two signals s and s′ with Wi(s
′) ≤ Wi(s), i ∈ I, define a new signal s− s′ :=




The interpretation should be clear. A signal s is obtained by taking probability mass from
the different realizations of the random variable θ; W (s) is the total probability that s obtains
given the prior on θ, and E(s) is the posterior mean of θ when s is observed. We now make the
link with the model of this paper. At the beginning of an arbitrary period where θG(−1) > 0,
the asset’s true value θ can be viewed as a discrete random variable with (ordered) realizations
{0, θG(−1), θG(0), θG(−1)}, and probability distribution G0 = 1 − λ, G1 = λq−, G2 = λq0,
and G3 = λq
+. The probability mass is then split into 6 different signals: sa, corresponding
to the information of speculators with (r, s) = (−1, 0), sb corresponding to the information of
speculators with (r, s) = (−1, 1), sc corresponding to r = 0, sd corresponding to (r, s) = (1, 0),
se corresponding to (r, s) = (1, 1), and s̃ corresponding to the information of liquidity traders.
The signals are easily computed as functions of σ (and of the primitives of the model). The
signal sa, e.g., is given by W0(sa) = µσ
−, W1(sa) = µ(1 − π)q−, and W2(sa) = W3(sa) = 0.
The signal s̃ is obtained by retrieving probability mass uniformly from the prior distribution.
Hence: Wi(s̃) = (1− µ)Gi, ∀i.








Intuitively, the signal ŝz corresponds to the information available given that a sell order was
passed at bid price pb = z. Note in particular that the unique equilibrium bid price – for σ
fixed – is given by inf{z : E(ŝz) ≤ z}.
We can now conclude the proof of the claim. Suppose there exist two equilibria, E and
E ′ say, where E entails σ and E ′ entails σ′, and which satisfy the conditions laid out in the
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statement of the claim, i.e. such that σ′ may be obtained from σ by shifting weight away







where W0(s) = W (s) = σ
− − σ′−, and E(sz) ≥ z. The intuition is the following. As we move
from σ to σ′ we shift ‘bad’ probability mass from the signal with the worse posterior, sa, to
signals with better posteriors, sc and sd.
51 Either E(s′c) and/or E(s
′
d) fall below z, or they
don’t. If they don’t then ŝ′z is obtained from ŝz by simply removing some probability mass
originating from G0. If they do then ŝ
′
z is obtained from ŝz by adding sc and sd; but in that
case, by construction: E(sc), E(sd) ≥ z.
Observe next that
E(ŝ′z) ≥ E(ŝz + sz) ≥
W (ŝz)
W (ŝz) +W (sz)
E(ŝz) +
W (sz)
W (ŝz) +W (sz)
z,
and hence:
E(ŝz) ≥ z ⇒ E(ŝ′z) ≥ z.
We obtain finally, using an earlier remark, that pb
′ ≥ pb, and the claim is established.

The next claim was proven within the proof of Claim 5. We state it here for the record.
In what follows, for a given equilibrium, let p denote the vector of bid and ask prices given by
(2).
Claim 6. Prices are uniquely determined by the strategy of the uninformed analyst. Let Ei,
i = 1, 2 denote two equilibria. Then:
σ1 = σ2 ⇒ p1 = p2.
Proof of Lemma 2: As usual we work the proof for the case where θGt (−1) > 0. Other
cases can be treated similarly. Let Ei, i = 1, 2 denote two equilibria, and assume that in E1
screening breaks down. The proof has four steps.
51C.f. Claim 4.
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Step 1: σ+2 ≥ σ+1 . Step 1 is proved by contradiction. Suppose σ+2 < σ+1 . Then ξa2(1, 0) =
ξa1(1, 0) = 1. Hence, from Claim 2: λ
e(1, σ2, ξ2) > λ





(call this Case 1), or σ−2 > σ
−
1 (call this Case 2). Case 1 immediately gives λ
e(0, σ2, ξ2) <
λe(0, σ1, ξ1) = λ. Case 2 gives λ
e(−1, σ2, ξ2) < λ
e(−1, σ1, ξ1) = λ, where we have made use
again of Claim 2. Either way, we obtain a contradiction with (8) in the second equilibrium.
Step 2: σ−2 ≥ σ−1 . The proof of Step 2 is again by contradiction. Suppose σ−2 < σ−1 . Three
cases must be considered: ∆σ0 ≥ 0 and ∆σ+ ≥ 0 (Case 1), ∆σ0 > 0 and ∆σ+ < 0 (Case
2), ∆σ0 < 0 and ∆σ+ > 0 (Case 3). In Case 1, Claim 5 yields pb2 ≥ pb1. Hence (generi-
cally) ξb2(−1, 1) = ξb1(−1, 1) = 1, from which we obtain using Claim 2 that λe(−1, σ2, ξ2) >
λe(−1, σ1, ξ1) = λ. But then we have a contradiction with (8) in the second equilibrium since
λe(0, σ2, ξ2) ≤ λ
e(0, σ1, ξ1) = λ. Consider Case 2 next. Reproducing the arguments of Step
1 yields λe(0, σ2, ξ2) < λ
e(0, σ1, ξ1) = λ = λ
e(1, σ1, ξ1) < λ
e(1, σ2, ξ2). Again, we obtain a
contradiction with (8) in the second equilibrium. Consider finally Case 3. Using Claim 2
yields λe(0, σ2, ξ2) > λ
e(0, σ1, ξ1) = λ = λ
e(1, σ1, ξ1) > λ
e(1, σ2, ξ2). Yet again, we obtain a
contradiction with (8) in the second equilibrium.




1 and hence λ
e(0, σ2, ξ2) >
λe(0, σ1, ξ1) = λ. This necessarily contradicts (8) in the second equilibrium, since the bad
analyst is unable to improve his reputation on average.
Step 4: E2 = E1. Combining Step 3 and Claim 6 yields p1 = p2. So ξ1 = ξ2 (generically).

Proof of Theorem 1: Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 gives for each history Ht a minimum
threshold reputation such that if at time t, given that history, λt is above the threshold,
then the market must be trapped (in any equilibrium). Note moreover that the threshold
λ̂(Ht) depends on history Ht only through It and the recommendations in Rt−1. For fixed
T therefore, the set of possible contemporaneous thresholds at time T is finite. Inspection of
the expressions given in the text for λ̂−(Ht) and λ̂+(Ht) shows that the maximum threshold
is attained at histories such that the same recommendation was made on the same asset T
times. Setting λ̂T0 equal to the maximum threshold at T completes the proof of the first part
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of the theorem. The second part of the theorem then follows immediately from taking the
relevant derivatives.

7.2 Proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 2
Before proving Proposition 2 and Theorem 2, we establish a series of claims. Claim 7 estab-
lishes a lower bound on the rate at which the uninformed analyst issues recommendations each
period. Claim 8 lower-bounds the probability that a significant jump in reputation occurs,
whenever screening is efficient. Claim 9 shows that unless reputation converges to zero or one
then screening will eventually become efficient. Claim 10 concludes that reputation converges
to either zero or one, almost surely. Finally, Claim 11 shows that reputation converges to the
‘correct’ value. With these results in hand, we then prove the theorem.
Claim 7. There exists δ > 0 such that in any equilibrium, for any history Ht and recommen-
dation r: σrt > δ.
Proof of Claim 7: Notice that due to liquidity traders we can find ` > 0 such that for any
rt, yt and ξt then (using notation from Claim 1):
`−1 < Lt(yt|rt, ξt) < `.





]. Thus for any
Ht, rt, yt and ξt:
Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, G)
Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, B)
=
qrtt Pt(yt|rt, ξt, G)










Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, G)
Pt(yt, rt|σt, ξt, B)
> 1.
The claim now follows by setting δ = 1−φ
2
`−1, since if the bad analyst were ever to issue
recommendation r with less than probability δ, then he could, by recommending r, improve
his reputation with certainty. But this is impossible in equilibrium.

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Claim 8. For all λ̃ ∈ (0, 1), there exists ελ̃ > 0 and δλ̃ > 0 with the following property: if
|λt − λ̃| < δλ̃ then, in any equilibrium where screening is efficient during period t:
Pt(|λt+1 − λt| ≥ ελ̃) ≥ b,
where b > 0 is independent of λ̃.
Proof of Claim 8: Let λ̃ ∈ (0, 1), λt = λ̃, and consider an equilibrium where screening is
efficient. We will show that we can find ελ̃, and b independent of λ̃ such that the highlighted
equation of the claim holds.
One recommendation r∗ ∈ {−1, 1} must have σr∗t ≤ qr
∗
t (this follows from Observation 2).
Let y∗ denote the action of the speculator with (rt = r




∗, 0) = 0. Using (1) yields
λt+1(rt = r




t (γπ + (1− γ))
λtqr
∗
t (γπ + (1− γ)) + (1− λt)σr
∗
t (1− γ)
≥ λt(γπ + (1− γ))
λt(γπ + (1− γ)) + (1− λt)(1− γ)
> λt.
Let ελ̃ be defined by the difference between the final two terms of the right-hand side:
ελ̃ =
λ̃(γπ + (1− γ))
λ̃(γπ + (1− γ)) + (1− λ̃)(1− γ)
− λ̃.





} together satisfy the conditions we were looking for, with δ
defined by Claim 7.
The claim follows by continuity of ελ̃ (defined above) as a function of λ̃.

The sequence {λt} is a bounded martingales with respect to the filtration {Ht}. The
Martingale Convergence Theorem thus applies. We let in what follows the random variable λ
denote the (a.s.) limit of the sequence {λt}.
Claim 9. Let W denote the event λ /∈ {0, 1}. Then, conditional on W , screening eventually
becomes efficient, a.s..
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Proof of Claim 9: Focus here on a single asset, in order to save on notation (the proof
extends in the obvious way to any finite number of assets). The process {θGt (0)} is a bounded
martingale with respect to the filtration {Ht}, under τ = G. The Martingale Convergence
Theorem thus applies. Moreover, clearly, limt→∞ θ
G
t (0) ∈ {−1, 1}. This implies, in turn,
that either λ = 0, or limt→∞ θ
G
t (0) exists and takes values in {−1, 1}. The random variable
limt→∞ θ
G
t (0) is thus well-defined under W . Denote θ
G := limt→∞ θ
G
t (0), where the random
variable is now defined over the entire W .
We condition henceforth on W . Suppose to fix ideas that θG = 1 (the case θG = −1 is
similar and omitted). Then, for any ε > 0, we can find a time from which point onwards
|θGt (r)− 1| < ε, for all r. Choosing ε small enough yields from some time onwards vt(−1, 1) =
θGt (−1) > λtθGt = p0t , since by assumption the limit λ < 1. Next, applying Claim 4 gives
vt(−1, 0) < pbt < p0t < vt(−1, 1),
and shows that screening eventually becomes efficient (a.s.) on the negative side.
We proceed to show that screening eventually becomes efficient on the positive side too.
Applying again Claim 4, observe that
pat ≥
1− γ
(1− γ) + γλtπ
p0t +
γλtπ
(1− γ) + γλtπ
θGt (1).
As λ > 0, from some time onwards pat is thus bounded away from p
0
t . But then vt(1, 0) ≥ pat
must imply βt(1, 0) > λt (recall that β(r, s) denotes an investor’s updated belief of the analyst’s
type after observing (r, s)), which in turn implies λe(1, σt, ξt) > λt, contradicting (8). Hence
vt(1, 0) < p
a
t , and screening eventually becomes efficient on the positive side too.

Claim 10. Let λ = lim
t→∞
λt. Then λ ∈ {0, 1}, a.s..
Proof of Claim 10: Let W (λ̃, δλ̃/2) denote the event |λ − λ̃| < δλ̃/2, where λ̃ ∈ (0, 1) and
δλ̃ as defined in Claim 8. Clearly, we can choose δλ̃ such that W (λ̃, δλ̃/2) ⊂ W , where as
before W denotes the event λ ∈ (0, 1). Using Claim 9, for any ω ∈ W (λ̃, δλ̃/2) we can (almost
surely) define a smallest time T (ω) such that for all s ≥ T (ω): (a) screening is efficient and




Furthermore, applying Claim 8:
P
(
|λs+1 − λs| ≥ ελ̃|Vk
)
≥ b , s ≥ k.










Let B(λ̃, δλ̃/2) denote the open ball with center λ̃ and radius δλ̃/2. For any n, the interval
[1/n, 1 − 1/n] has an open cover consisting of open balls B(λ̃, δλ̃/2), λ̃ ∈ [1/n, 1 − 1/n]. By
















λ ∈ B(λ̃s, δλ̃s/2)
)
= 0.
This being true for all n, we finally obtain P(λ ∈ {0, 1}) = 1.

Claim 11. The market learns τ , almost surely. Let λ = lim
t→∞
λt: if τ = G then λ = 1 a.s.; if
τ = B then λ = 0 a.s..























∣∣∣B] = λ01−λ0 , for all t. Fatou’s Lemma then gives E[ λ1−λ∣∣∣B] ≤ λ01−λ0 . Hence
P(λ = 1|B) = 0.




∣∣∣G] = 1−λ0λ0 , for all t, and so E[1−λλ ∣∣∣G] ≤ 1−λ0λ0 . Hence
P(λ = 0|G) = 0.
Claim 11 now follows immediately, by application of Claim 10.

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Proof of Proposition 2: Fix an arbitrary history Ht with ι(t) = i′. If the analyst has
reputation λt ≥ λ̂(Ht) we are done. If he has reputation λt < λ̂(Ht), construct a new history
HT , T > t, such that ι(s) 6= i′ for t < s < T and ι(T ) = i′. By Claim 11 there exists a finite
such history which is reached with strictly positive probability where λT ≥ λ̂(Ht). Notice that
λ̂(HT ) depends on HT only through θGT , and given the way we have constructed HT : θGT = θGt .
Thus, λ̂(HT ) = λ̂(Ht), and hence λT ≥ λ̂(HT ).

Proof of Theorem 2: If the expert is a good expert then the Law of Large Numbers yields
lim
t→∞
θGt (0) = θ, almost surely. Both parts of the theorem now follow from Claim 11.

7.3 Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 and Observations 2-5
Proof of Proposition 3: The threshold value λ̂ is retrieved from (6)-(7), setting θGt = 0.
Any value ε no less than the maximum reputational jump of an analyst with current reputation
λ̂ will satisfy the condition stated in the proposition.





t (0, σt, ξt) > λt, contradicting (8). Hence
σ0t ≥ q0t = 1/2, with strict inequality unless the market is trapped. This gives Observation 2.
Next, note that for any history Ht and in any equilibrium













where by definition: ξat (r, s) + ξ
b
t (r, s) ≤ 1, for all (r, s). When the market is trapped this last
inequality becomes an equality. This gives Observation 3.
Observations 4 and 5 are immediate, since p0t = Et[θ] = λtθGt .

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Proof of Proposition 4: The arguments of the proof for break-down of screening follow
along the lines of Theorem 1. Let βt(r, s) denote an investor’s updated belief of τ from
observing (rt, st) = (r, s). Observe that for all r ∈ {−1, 1} and all t, qrt ≥ 1 − φ > 0.
Thus, if π < 1, we can find ε > 0 such that |1 − λt| < ε/2 ⇒ |1 − βt(r, s)| < ε, for
all (r, s) ∈ {−1, 1} × {0, 1}. Letting ε tend to zero, vt(r, s) then approaches θGt (r), for all
(r, s) ∈ {−1, 1} × {0, 1}. pat (resp. pbt ), by contrast, is bounded away from θGt (1) (resp.
θGt (−1)), so long as µ < 1. These arguments establish that if π < 1 and µ < 1 then screening
necessarily breaks down, above a threshold level of reputation.
We next establish an analogue of Observation 1 from Section 3 and show that we can
find ε(·) : [0, 1) → R+, limδ→0 ε(δ) = 0, such that if in equilibrium screening breaks down
then |λt+1 − λt| ≤ ε(δ). Fix δ, and consider an equilibrium in which screening breaks down.
λt+1 is then a deterministic function of rt, which we may write λt+1(r) for rt = r. Moreover,
|λt+1(r) − λt+1(−r)| is strictly increasing in ‖qt − σt‖. It is now immediate to see from the
form of the analyst’s payoffs that fixing ‖q
t
− σt‖ > 0 and letting δ tend to zero must either
make payoffs from recommending rt = 1 strictly greater than payoffs from recommending
rt = −1, or the converse. This is impossible, in equilibrium. Hence, for each δ ∈ [0, 1) we
can find η(δ) > 0, such that ‖q
t
− σt‖ < η(δ), in any equilibrium. This in turn delivers, for
each δ ∈ [0, 1), an ε(δ) > 0 such that |λt+1 − λt| ≤ ε(δ), in any equilibrium. Furthermore
limδ→0 η(δ) = 0 and so, evidently, limδ→0 ε(δ) = 0.

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